Redefining Energy Security

As energy systems become targets, security expands from managing supply to sustaining systems under stress

I just wrapped up teaching the Geopolitics of Energy, my 21st year teaching the course. This semester, more than any other, has illustrated how fundamentally energy security is changing. What we have long taught as risk is now unfolding as reality.

In just the first months of 2026, more than 80 energy facilities across the Middle East have been attacked, over 100 strikes have hit Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, and 99 out of 100 oil and gas operators surveyed reported at least one category of cyber incident since late February.

Energy infrastructure is no longer simply exposed to risk; it is deliberately targeted, both physically and digitally, in ways that degrade capacity, disrupt markets, and extend far beyond the immediate theater of conflict.

It is too soon to know when or how the war with Iran will end, or what its geopolitical or economic consequences will be. But one thing is already certain: what is meant by energy security must be rethought. That recognition is what led Richard Haass and me, in a recent Project Syndicate piece titled "Redefining Energy Security," to step back and ask a more fundamental question: What does energy security mean in a world where infrastructure is targeted, supply chains can be weaponized, and disruption is persistent rather than episodic?

Energy security is often defined as ensuring reliable and affordable access to supplies. That definition is no longer sufficient. What recent events have exposed is that energy security must now encompass the maintenance and resilience of the systems that produce, refine, transport, and deliver energy.

In a world of contested transit routes, intricate infrastructure, and sophisticated forms of disruption, energy security is no longer just about supply. It is about whether the system itself can function under stress.

Today’s energy systems are operating under conditions of persistent disruption, where shocks are continuous, multi-dimensional, and increasingly intentional. The war with Iran, alongside Russia’s war in Ukraine, has made energy infrastructure a central target of conflict. Since late February, more than 80 facilities across the Middle East have been struck, and the financial cost is substantial. Rystad Energy estimates total damage could reach $58 billion, with repair costs starting at $34 billion. Iran’s infrastructure alone may account for roughly $19 billion. Damage to major gas facilities has removed significant capacity from global markets, with repair timelines stretching into years.

These are not short-term disruptions; parts of the system may be offline for months or longer. What matters now is how countries are responding.

Across Europe, energy systems are being reconfigured for a security environment defined by sustained threat. In Poland, grid operators conduct aerial surveillance of transmission lines using sensors that detect tampering or movement near critical infrastructure. Across the continent, utilities are hardening substations, burying cables, stockpiling spare parts, and deploying mobile substations to restore power if key nodes are disabled.

Energy systems are increasingly being integrated into national defense planning. Infrastructure protection is no longer just an operational concern; it is a strategic priority.

The United States faces equally serious challenges. Analysis from the Center for Strategic and International Studies highlights how the scale, age, and fragmentation of U.S. energy infrastructure create significant vulnerability. The grid spans hundreds of thousands of miles and connects thousands of facilities, creating a vast attack surface. Much of this infrastructure predates modern security threats. At the same time, increasing digitalization has expanded the number of potential entry points for cyberattacks.

The system’s fragmentation across regions, utilities, and regulatory structures makes coordinated defense more difficult, even as its interconnected nature amplifies the consequences of disruption. Adversaries understand this. Nation-state actors have demonstrated both the capability and intent to infiltrate energy systems, often positioning themselves for future disruption. What distinguishes this moment is not simply that risks have increased, but that they have expanded in scope.

Low-cost drones can disable billion-dollar assets. Cyberattacks can disrupt networks without physical damage. Interconnected systems amplify localized disruptions into cascading failures across sectors. Energy security is about ensuring that systems can operate under sustained stress, absorb repeated shocks, and recover quickly.

It is also about dependence. The model that has defined the past several decades of global integration, optimized for efficiency, is under strain. Conflict, sanctions, and the weaponization of supply chains have exposed the risks of reliance on systems that can be disrupted or leveraged in moments of crisis.

Countries are placing greater emphasis on domestic capacity, expanding production and generation where possible. Where they cannot, they are turning to suppliers and systems that are less exposed to disruption, fragmentation, or coercion. This is about reducing exposure.

In that Project Syndicate piece, we outlined ten priorities for redefining energy security in this environment: diversifying supply and routes, hardening infrastructure, building active defense capabilities, expanding strategic reserves, and prioritizing resilience over efficiency. We also emphasized maintaining a diversified energy mix, ensuring policy stability, and managing demand to reduce risk.

Energy security now requires layering across fuels, infrastructure, supply chains, and systems to ensure that no single point of failure can bring the system down. The economic stakes are significant. Energy underpins all other sectors, meaning disruptions do not remain contained; they cascade across economies.

There is a clear parallel with global supply chains. After COVID-19, firms moved from “just in time” to “just in case.” Energy systems are now undergoing the same shift.

At a much smaller scale, we are seeing versions of this dynamic play out in everyday systems. In the final weeks of the academic year, the widely used learning platform Canvas was taken offline for several hours following a cyberattack, leaving thousands of students across universities unable to access coursework, assignments, and exams.

It was disruptive, frustrating, but also instructive. Even short-lived disruptions to digital infrastructure can have immediate and widespread effects. When systems fail, the consequences are felt quickly and across entire networks of users. Now scale that to energy infrastructure: the grid, fuel distribution systems, or pipelines, and the stakes change entirely. What is an inconvenience in one context becomes a cascading economic and societal disruption in another.

Energy security is no longer about securing supply at the lowest cost. It is about managing risk in a world where infrastructure is targeted, systems are interconnected, and disruption is persistent. What comes next will be defined by resilience, control, and systems designed to reduce exposure to disruption at scale, as well as by how effectively countries build energy systems that endure under sustained pressure.

Thanks for reading! Always welcome comments and questions - and if you want me to address something in a future ECS, please let me know.

-Carolyn